Australian mining company, Liontown Resources Ltd., has just announced it’s agreed to a buyout proposal of AUD 6.6 billion (USD 4.3 billion) by US lithium producer Albemarle Corp (ALB). TrendForce’s latest “2023 Global Li-Ion Battery Industry Chain Market Supply and Demand Report,” indicates that global lithium production in 2022 hit approximately 860,000 tons of Lithium Carbonate Equivalent (LCE). ALB, with its diverse lithium portfolio (spodumene, lithium salt, and tolling), accounted for over 180,000 tons of LCE. Predictions for 2023 spotlight a global lithium production reaching 1.21 million tons LCE, and ALB is set to churn out 200,000 tons of that, holding firmly onto the lead with its 17% market share.

TrendForce reports that ALB has strategically secured the planet’s most abundant, high-quality, and cost-efficient reserves of lithium salt lake and minerals across regions like Chile, Australia, and the US. Moreover, when it comes to lithium refinement, ALB emerges as the global titan with the world’s greatest lithium salt production capacity. As it stands, ALB’s annual production capacity for lithium hydroxide reaches 110,000 tons, accounting for 23% of the world’s entire production.

Liontown, a key supplier of Australia’s battery minerals, holds the reins to two major hard rock lithium deposits: Kathleen Valley and Buldania. These areas boast lithium reserves of 156 million tons (5.4 million tons LCE) and 14.9 million tons (370,000 tons LCE), respectively. As Kathleen Valley gears up for completion by the end of 2023, its inaugural production phase is set to roll out by 2Q24, targeting an annual yield of 500,000 tons of lithium spodumene concentrate. And that’s just the start, with plans to elevate this figure to a whopping 700,000 tons annually. On the other hand, the Buldania project is still in its nascent stage, focused on exploration and surveying.

With ambitions to acquire Australian miner Liontown, ALB set to command the world’s largest lithium resources, TrendForce believes.

Should ALB’s acquisition of Liontown materialize, it would cement its control of global lithium resources and bolster its lithium salt production framework. Yet, ALB isn’t the sole player in this vast industry. Major lithium producers, including SQM, Tianqi Lithium, Ganfeng Lithium, Yahua Industrial, Chengxin Lithium, and Livent, are fervently ramping up their production capabilities in lithium carbonate and lithium hydroxide.

Lithium, the backbone of modern tech, is set to see its global demand skyrocket. TrendForce’s insights reveal a bustling 2022 with around 40 lithium mining projects worldwide. After 2025, the number of projects in production will increase to a staggering 100+. To safeguard their global dominance and sharpen their competitive edge, lithium chemical producers are strategically aligning with upstream lithium miners to secure lithium resources. Case in point: Livent’s recent merger with Allkem in May of this year and ALB’s designs on Liontown. This momentum signifies a trend toward a more consolidated global lithium resource landscape, with mergers and acquisitions becoming the norm in upcoming years.

According to sources familiar with the matter within Xiaomi, as cited by Chinese media outlet Jiemian News, the Xiaomi electric vehicle that has been spotted multiple times on the roads has finalized its battery supplier list. Both selected suppliers are Chinese companies. The primary battery supplier is set to be CALB, while the secondary supplier is the well-known CATL.

Reports indicate that Xiaomi initially planned to have CATL as the primary supplier, but there was a change of plan. This change could be attributed to the conclusion of patent disputes between CATL and CALB regarding lithium-ion batteries, cathode electrode sheets, and battery-related patents. The National Intellectual Property Administration invalidated the two aforementioned patents held by CATL, allowing CALB to re-enter the market with competitive pricing against CATL.

The report mentions that Xiaomi’s initial electric vehicle production volume is relatively low, which limits its bargaining power. The cost per battery pack starts at 80,000 RMB, accounting for approximately half of the overall cost. The proportion of supplies from the primary and secondary suppliers will reportedly be adjusted based on Xiaomi electric vehicle’s actual sales after its launch. The report also highlights the possibility of Xiaomi introducing additional battery suppliers like BYD through an open bidding process to lower battery costs and enhance bargaining capabilities in the future.

(Photo credit: Xiaomi FB)

During the first half of 2023, the polysilicon industry experienced expansion in production capacity, resulting in an oversupply of polysilicon and a subsequent downward trend in the entire industry chain prices. However, by the end of June, the prices of polysilicon reached a near-bottom point, and both polysilicon and wafer prices stabilized, leading to a significant increase in customer demand.

Polysilicon: In the first half of 2023, the polysilicon market witnessed fluctuating prices, starting with an initial rise followed by a subsequent decline, and an underlying issue of oversupply persisted into the second half of the year.

In early January, the expansion of polysilicon production capacity coincided with weakened demand as the year-end approached, leading to a significant decline in prices. By mid-January, the polysilicon prices fell below the cost line for polysilicon enterprises. In response, leading enterprises refrained from selling polysilicon at such low prices, causing a price rebound. As February began, the operation rate of wafer production significantly increased, leading to higher procurement demands for polysilicon and consequently a sharp rise in its prices. However, by the middle of the month, most polysilicon orders for the month had been signed, dampening the stimulus for further price increases. In March, the pressure of excess inventory prompted some polysilicon enterprises to cut prices to facilitate higher shipments, resulting in a slow reduction of prices. Moving into April, the overall supply of polysilicon remained abundant, and with strong willingness among silicon enterprises to sell, prices continued to decline gradually. May witnessed a further increase in polysilicon output, causing a faster decline in prices due to inventory accumulation and pressure from crystal pulling activities. As June approached, the market faced the release of additional production capacity and a considerable accumulation of inventory. This led to polysilicon prices nearly reaching the cost line as market demand fell short of expectations. In response, some enterprises opted for temporary shutdowns, overhauls, and delayed production to reduce inventory pressure. Moreover, increased procurement volumes from crystal pulling plants helped stabilize prices temporarily.

In July, the polysilicon inventory levels experienced a decline compared to the previous period due to increased downstream demand, leading to price stabilization. However, there remains a possibility of a slight price rebound. Projections indicate that in the third quarter, polysilicon prices might rebound to more than RMB 80/KG. The second half of 2023 is expected to witness a peak in photovoltaic demand, and the current price levels within the industry chain can help stimulate this demand. However, the third quarter will also see the concentration of new production capacity from several polysilicon manufacturers entering the market. As a result, the oversupply of polysilicon is unlikely to be significantly altered. While there may be a chance for prices to rebound, both the timing and extent of such a rebound are expected to be very limited.

Monthly price trend of Polysilicon Unit: RMB/KG

Wafer: In the first half of 2023, wafer prices experienced fluctuations with an initial rise followed by a decline. As the second half of 2023 approaches, the wafer prices still face a potential downside risk.

In mid-January, downstream pullback was observed in wafer prices due to increased cost pressures and inventory consumption among polysilicon enterprises. However, early February witnessed a surge in downstream procurement demand, resulting in a slight shortage of polysilicon supply and subsequently leading to sharp price increases for wafers. By later February, the wafer market saw stability as the supply tightened due to the influence of crucible quality, leading to a decline in cell procurement speed. In early March, the supply of high-purity quartz sand remained tight, restricting overall wafer output. The rising wafer costs and limited supply provided support for a slight price increase. As April arrived, the arrival of imported sand eased the tight supply of quartz sand, leading to an increase in wafer production. However, subdued downstream demand resulted in a slight price decline. In May, to avoid losses caused by falling prices, cell companies showed reduced willingness to procure wafers, leading to an accumulation of wafer inventory. The rapid decline in polysilicon prices further contributed to a sharp drop in wafer prices. In early June, wafer enterprises responded by reducing production and cutting prices to address inventory concerns. However, the oversupply situation persisted, and with upstream silicon prices experiencing a significant decline, wafer prices followed suit and declined sharply. Towards the end of June, wafer inventory gradually rebounded to a more reasonable level, and the decline range of polysilicon prices narrowed down. As a result, cell enterprises displayed increased willingness to purchase, leading to wafer prices ceasing further declines first.

In July, there is an expected increase in the output of cell modules, and upstream polysilicon prices have stabilized. However, during this period, there are rumors of India potentially banning the export of quartz sand. Although manufacturers have confirmed that it is merely a rumor, it has still caused some short-term nervousness in the market. Consequently, wafer prices have shown slight signs of rebounding. Nevertheless, based on the current statistics from TrendForce, the effective capacity or output of wafers in a single month remains significantly higher than that of downstream cell and modules. Even if there is an explosive demand for wafers in the second half of the year, there is still a substantial amount of new production capacity waiting to be released. As a result, the market continues to face an oversupply situation, and there remains a considerable risk of declining wafer prices later on.

Monthly price trend of wafer Unit: RMB/Pcs

Cell: In the first half of 2023, cell prices experienced sharp fluctuations, with N-type cells maintaining a premium advantage.

In mid to late January, there was a significant increase in polysilicon and wafer prices, prompting cell prices to rise accordingly. Early February saw a surge in module production scheduling, driving up the demand for cells and supporting their rising costs, leading to further price increases. However, by mid and late February, the interplay between module inventory and pricing resulted in slight declines in cell prices. In March, cost pressures prompted cell enterprises to consider raising prices. However, the high inventory levels and resistance from downstream module companies, unable to sell at higher prices, led to price stability. Towards the end of the month, increased demand for G12 cells caused prices to rise slightly. Moving into April, the overall supply and demand for cells achieved a better balance, resulting in generally stable prices. G12 cells, due to tight supply and demand, commanded significantly higher prices compared to M10 cells. However, May saw a sharp decline in upstream polysilicon and wafer prices. Additionally, downstream module companies exerted pressure to reduce prices, leading to a rapid decline in cell prices. In June, as upstream raw material prices were approaching their bottom, cell prices continued their downward trend. Towards the end of the month, the stabilization of polysilicon and wafer prices, coupled with increased downstream purchasing demand, resulted in a narrower range of cell price declines.

Upstream polysilicon and wafer prices have stabilized, providing a favorable environment for the market. Furthermore, the surge in customer demand has led to a significant month-on-month increase in module production scheduling for July, which is expected to provide strong support for cell prices. If downstream demand surpasses expectations or experiences an early explosion, there is a potential opportunity for cell prices to rebound in the future market. Throughout the first half of 2023, the production capacity of N-type cells fell short of expectations, but the robust customer demand created a structural shortage of N-type products in the market. This resulted in a price gap between N-type and P-type cells. However, in the third quarter, manufacturers are gradually increasing N-type production capacity, which should alleviate the intense supply constraints of N-type products. Yet, this might further stimulate explosive demand for N-type products among customers.

Monthly price trend of cells Unit: RMB/W

Module: In the first half of 2023, overall module prices experienced fluctuations and showed a downward trend. However, expectations for the second half of 2023 are optimistic, as customer demand is anticipated to explode.

In early January, as customer projects reached their end stages, there was a gradual decrease in procurement demand. The sharp decline in upstream raw material prices impacted the modules sector, leading to price fluctuations. In February, with customer projects not yet scaling up and market demand increment falling short of expectations, module prices remained relatively stable. Come early March, customer purchasing was not active, and stable cell prices contributed to the overall stability of module prices. Towards the middle and end of the month, there was an uptick in overseas demand, but cost pressures persisted, keeping module prices stable. Throughout April, module prices continued to remain stable as costs remained unchanged. However, early May saw temporary falls in upstream polysilicon, wafer, and cell prices, which did not immediately affect module prices, allowing them to maintain stability. Nonetheless, by mid-May, the impact of the declining industry chain prices started affecting modules, leading to lower-than-expected customer demand and a significant decline in module prices. In June, although polysilicon and wafer prices gradually stopped falling, customer demand had not yet surged on a large scale, leading to a continued downward trend in module prices. In some instances, module prices even dropped below RMB 1.2/W.

Currently, module prices are experiencing irregular fluctuations, but overall, they have reached the lowest level in recent years. As upstream prices have started stabilizing, it is expected that module prices will soon follow suit, stabilizing at around RMB 1.3-1.4/W. This price point can act as a stimulus for a quick pickup in market demand. In the domestic market, positive signals of increasing demand are evident. Large-size base projects have already commenced construction, and the country has issued the second batch of project lists, with preparations underway. Additionally, plans for the third batch of projects are in progress, and the centralized market is expected to witness an explosion in demand. For the main overseas market, Europe’s inventory has reduced after a period of consumption, but the grid consumption issue has posed a challenge for demand revitalization. However, with the arrival of summer, Europe is expected to face peak electricity consumption, presenting a new opportunity for demand pickup in the region.

Regarding the U.S. market, being a high-value overseas market, it plays a crucial role for various leading module companies in their sales strategies. However, policy fluctuations in the U.S. market have always been a concern for both the supply and demand sides. The Middle East market has been notably active this year, with recent signings of large-scale sales frameworks and cooperation announcements on the manufacturing side. As a result, this market holds considerable potential for future growth and is worth close attention.
Monthly price trend of module Unit: RMB/W

In the first half of 2023, there was a continuous release of polysilicon production capacity, leading to intensified dynamics between the upstream and downstream industry chains, resulting in price fluctuations. Looking ahead to the second half of 2023, the situation of excess supply of polysilicon is anticipated to persist, making it challenging to bring about significant changes. Consequently, any potential price rebound is expected to be limited in both timing and extent. The wafer market remains oversupplied, presenting a downside risk to prices. On the other hand, the cell market is experiencing gradual release of N-type cell production capacity, with expectations of an explosive demand for N-type products. As for modules, both domestic and overseas demands for installed capacity are projected to improve, indicating a positive turn in the market outlook for the latter half of 2023.

Toyota announced during a technical conference on June 13, 2023, that Toyota has identified suitable materials to commercialize solid-state battery technology around 2027-2028, intending to introduce new energy vehicles powered by these batteries to the market.

Out of the 2.17 million electric vehicles (including BEV, PHEV, HEV, FCV) sold by Toyota in 2022, BEVs accounted for less than 1%, indicating a significant lag behind its competitors in the BEV sector. However, Toyota possesses over 100 solid-state battery patents and showcased a solid-state battery prototype as early as 2020, finally catching up in the solid-state battery race.

According to TrendForce’s analysis, current new energy vehicles primarily use nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) or lithium iron phosphate (LFP) as cathode materials, and graphite as anode material. NCM batteries offer higher energy density, with a system limit of around 250-260Wh/kg, but come with higher costs and a risk of thermal runaway. On the other hand, although LFP batteries are safer, less prone to thermal runaway, and more cost-effective, their energy density is significantly lower than that of NCM, with a system limit of approximately 160-170Wh/kg.

To achieve energy densities surpassing 300Wh/kg and reaching the 400-500Wh/kg target, lithium batteries will primarily focus on adjusting anode materials in the future. This includes incorporating higher-capacity materials such as silicon oxide, silicon carbon, or metallic lithium to increase the capacity of individual battery cells. However, using these high-activity anode materials in combination with traditional liquid electrolytes carries a higher risk of triggering thermal runaway during the charging and discharging processes.

In contrast, solid-state electrolytes provide structural stability, effectively preventing short circuits in batteries. By removing the separator film, solid-state batteries achieve a more compact size and higher energy density compared to liquid lithium batteries. In summary, solid-state batteries solve the challenge of balancing safety and energy density that traditional lithium batteries face, making them the most promising battery solution for future new energy vehicles.

However, during the development of solid-state battery technology, Toyota encountered an increase in interface impedance and a decrease in electrode-electrolyte adhesion due to the transition from liquid to solid electrolytes. These issues lead to battery capacity decline and affect cycle life, posing one of the many technical challenges in the current development of solid-state batteries.

Considering the difficulties involved, some battery manufacturers have shifted their focus to semi-solid-state batteries, such as CATL and Welion. Given Toyota’s current reliance on Chinese liquid battery technology for their development of solid-state batteries, it seems like a formidable task to achieve a breakthrough. Even if they overcome these challenges, the ability to replicate the success from the lab to actual vehicles remains uncertain.

Nevertheless, considering Toyota’s current situation, it may be more reasonable to place their bet on solid-state batteries rather than persistently chasing after the liquid battery sector. Although this strategic move carries high risks, it represents Toyota’s best and potentially last opportunity for overtaking competitors in the new energy vehicle field.

(Photo credit: Toyota Motor Corporation)

Tesla, the driving force behind the next-generation electric vehicle(EV) battery standards, has been vigorously promoting the 46800 cylindrical battery cell in recent years.

Being Tesla’s key collaborator, Panasonic had initially scheduled mass production of these batteries for April this year. However, in a recent announcement, they revealed that their production plans would be delayed by at least a year, with full-scale production not set to kick off until between April and September 2024.

This strategic pivot is aimed at optimizing performance, but what we care about is the implications it might hold for the EV supply chain – could this mean that the strong alliance between these two giants is beginning to waver? And if so, what sort of ripple effect could this have on the relevant market?

Tesla’s secret weapon in the EV price war

Given the capacity of 46800 battery cell is five times that of the 21700 battery, it means fewer cells are required to achieve the same total battery pack capacity.

For instance, a 75kWh-based Model 3 uses 4,416 units of the 21700 battery cells packed in the traditional way of Cell to Module (CTM), which assembles batteries into modules which are then encased into a battery pack and then fitted onto the vehicle’s chassis.

In contrast, a Model Y with the same battery capacity would need only 828 units of the 46800 battery cells, leading to a 14% saving on battery costs. Coupled with Tesla’s integrated chassis technology (CTC), where batteries are not assembled into modules but instead directly encapsulated under the cabin floor, this provides an ultimate, cost-effective solution for Tesla.

When Tesla first announced its 46800 battery plan in 2020, its battery capacity was pioneering among all batteries. Taking advantage of this favorable environment, Tesla has been both expanding their production and involving cylindrical battery manufacturers, like Panasonic, in their comprehensive plans.

Tesla has set up a 46800 battery production line at their Fremont factory in California. As of the end of 2022, their production capacity was about 4GWh, which can only support 50,000 to 60,000 75kWh EVs and is far from their sales volume.

In terms of a long-term strategy, Tesla not only aims to ramp up their production capacity but is also heavily reliant on external suppliers like Panasonic to support its ever-growing demand.

Hence, ever since the launch of Model S in 2012, Panasonic has remained Tesla’s primary supplier of power batteries. And thanks to Tesla’s booming sales, Panasonic has dominated the power battery market for quite a while.

Roadblocks for Tesla and Panasonic’s Alliance

So, what does Panasonic’s delay mean for its position in the market? In fact, as an important chess piece in Tesla’s battery market strategy, Panasonic has been under considerable pressure.

Externally, there’s the relentless price cuts from Tesla. In 2018, as Tesla’s sales skyrocketed, they started purchasing batteries from more suppliers, thereby indirectly pressuring Panasonic to lower prices.

In addition, the internal discord has also been shadowing the project. On one hand, the long-term supply to Tesla has not brought as impressive profit performance as anticipated for Panasonic’s battery business. On the other hand, sticking to Tesla’s technology route, Panasonic has missed a great deal of opportunities to partner with Japanese car makers due to its conservative investments in the mainstream hydrogen energy batteries, which has in turn stirred internal questioning.

Since 2020, both South LGES and CATL have become suppliers to Tesla, causing Panasonic’s market share to fall to third place globally. But even then, Panasonic’s many years of expertise in cylindrical batteries made it Tesla’s Top choice when deciding to manufacture the 46800 battery. This was widely seen as Panasonic’s best chance to regain its leading ground and to solidify long-term partnership with Tesla.

Is Panasonic about to miss out on its prime opportunity?

All in all, we believe that this delay could not only disrupt Tesla’s price war strategy but also make Panasonic miss the golden chance to secure its dominance in the new technology. With multiple battery manufacturers, such as CATL, LGES, and Eve Energy, announcing that they will start mass production of the 46800 battery in 2024 or 2025, Panasonic will face unprecedented competition.

As of Q1 2023, Panasonic has seen its market share fall to fourth place. Obviously, maintaining its industry leadership becomes more of a daunting task for the company in the race. Although they’ve announced plans to build at least two 46800 battery factories in North America, it won’t serve as a panacea for their problems.

Beyond overcoming technical hurdles and expediting mass production, Panasonic also has a mountain to climb in terms of diversifying its customer base, further lessening the risk of an over-reliance on Tesla. These are inevitably long-term challenges that Panasonic cannot sidestep.